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Chapter 2 
Elections and political communication 
Donnacha Ó Beacháin 
 
Election campaigns are sporadic events during which the apathy that the non-
participatory political system engenders has to be momentarily surmounted to inject 
renewed legitimacy into the system of organised political parties. How the citizenry 
are to be motivated to mobilise from their habitual passivity depends on the quality 
and quantity of political communication with the electorate. In short it is influenced, if 
not determined, by the character of the election campaign. This chapter provides a 
brief introduction to how those competing for votes have communicated with the Irish 
electorate since the foundation of the state.  
 
Campaign slogans, techniques and candidates  
As the revolutionary generation that had monopolised political power for the first four 
decades of independence exited the political stage during the 1960s, prospective 
candidates for election had to find new ways of getting on the ticket. For those not 
part of a political dynasty forged during the formative years of the state, sport proved 
another way of coming to the attention of the electorate, and the party leaderships. 
The 1965 general election returned 17 former Gaelic games stars (Whyte, 1966, 31) 
but a focus on GAA luminaries provides only a partial picture of the influence of the 
organisation. Brian Farrell (1971, 321–22) has noted that the 1969 election returned in 
addition to 15 GAA ‘stars’ four GAA county officials and another 25 deputies who 
had been or continued to be active within the GAA as players or officials. The most 
significant figure of this new generation was Jack Lynch, who governed Ireland for 
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most of the period spanning the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, and whose complete lack 
of a political pedigree was compensated for by having won six All-Ireland hurling and 
football medals.  
 
The passing of the revolutionary generation also led to increasing localism. Almost a 
third of those elected to the Dáil on the back of their revolutionary exploits 
represented constituencies other than their home districts (Cohan, 1972, 61) and, 
initially at least, the most prominent represented more than one constituency with 
some elected to both the Dublin and Belfast legislatures. This feature of revolutionary 
politics freed representatives from dependence on a local bailiwick and allowed them 
to view issues from a national rather than a parochial perspective. Conversely, the 
localism that typified the post-revolutionary elite has had the opposite effect, 
restricting the manoeuvrability of deputies and encouraging a provincial outlook, a 
trend accentuated by the PR-STV electoral system. Whereas, national prominence in 
the revolutionary era usually preceded constituency supremacy, for the post-
revolutionary generations local dominance has been the only means towards 
achieving distinction at a national level. These contrasting routes to political eminence 
created different political creatures. Leaders of the revolutionary elite were politicians 
by accident thrust into a political life that few had envisaged when taking up arms 
against the established regime during the 1916 Easter Rising or subsequent war of 
independence. Their successors were politicians by design and had to undergo a more 
gradual and less dramatic progression to high office.  
 
The normalisation that followed the Irish revolution and consequent localism that 
developed amongst the Irish political class is well-illustrated by comparing the 
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percentage of members of the revolutionary elite who had served on a county council 
with that of the post-revolutionary elite. Twenty nine per cent of politicians of the 
revolutionary elite had given such service at local level, the majority beginning their 
tenure shortly before their election as TDs. By the 1960s this figure had risen to 51% 
as service at local level rapidly became a sine qua non for entry to politics at national 
level (Cohan, 61). In addition, the absence of a revolution meant that the majority of 
aspiring politicians of the post-revolutionary generations have had to serve longer at 
local level before achieving Dáil success. This gradual progression to high office in a 
political system has inculcated a more gradualist approach to political problems. 
While the revolutionary elite was typified by its ‘lack of connection with any formal 
governing apparatus that came before’ (Cohan, 59), its successors grew up in a stable 
political environment that enjoyed majority support. This in turn made the concept of 
radical constitutional or political change more alien and unorthodox than it had 
appeared to many politicians of the earlier generation. 
 
All of this has in turn contributed to changing political communication in Ireland. The 
political message became increasingly moderate, the target audience local, and the 
support base less partisan. The balance sheet has become one of votes won or lost 
rather than policy goals achieved or postponed. Writing in the 1960s of the mass 
peoples’ parties (volkspartien) of which Fianna Fáil was Ireland’s prime example, 
Otto Kirchheimer (1966, 192) argued that ‘there is need for enough brand 
differentiation to make the article plainly recognisable, but the degree of 
differentiation must never be so great as to make the potential customer fear he will 
be out on a limb.’ Principles were revered but ultimately elastic and Fianna Fáil’s 
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main threat when in government was competition from a more attractively packaged 
brand of a nearly identical product. 
 
Coinciding with the departure of the revolutionary generation was the advent of a 
national television service in 1961, which brought with it new challenges for those 
seeking election. The 1965 election campaign was the first to receive TV coverage 
and in February 1973, RTÉ had another pioneering moment when Jack Lynch became 
the first Taoiseach to concede defeat live on television, bringing 16 years of Fianna 
Fáil rule to an end. Television’s role during elections expanded thereafter. For the 
2007 election RTÉ had, for the first time ever, an outside broadcasting unit in every 
one of the 43 constituencies (RTÉ, 2007a). From the beginning, senior politicians had 
been wary of television. In his televised address on the opening of Telifís Éireann, 
President de Valera had noted that while TV could contribute to the vigour and 
confidence of the nation it could also, if used unwisely, ‘lead through demoralization 
to decadence and disillusion’ (see McLoone and McMahon, 1984, 149–50). Insofar as 
political debate is concerned, parliamentary business has been televised since 1991, 
three decades after the idea was first mooted (Dunne, 1961). The impact that the 
arrival of television has had on Irish election campaigns should not be 
underestimated. As Olivia O’Leary (2006, 10) has pointed out, ‘in a television age, 
most policy messages were too complicated, too confusing. You needed a single 
product with easy brand recognition. It was simple. You marketed the leader.’  
 
Jack Lynch was better placed than Liam Cosgrave, or his predecessor James Dillon, 
to grasp the possibilities offered by new technologies as evidenced by the razzmatazz 
generated by his presidential style tour via helicopter in 1977. Cosgrave’s 
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performances were, by contrast, wooden and he was consistently ridiculed as miserly, 
authoritarian and uncharismatic in the hugely popular satirical programme ‘Hall’s 
Pictorial Weekly’. Much of the innovative character of Fianna Fáil’s 1977 election 
campaign can be attributed to the party’s young general secretary, Séamus Brennan, 
who had spent two months with the US Democratic Party’s presidential campaign 
during the previous year to pick up some tips from the Carter v Ford pre-race. There 
he learned the style of electioneering that parties in Ireland would have to embrace if 
they were to successfully adapt to a new age, increasingly shaped by television and 
consumerism. One of the many novelties that resulted from Brennan’s brainstorming 
was the commissioning of Ireland’s first election pop song. Entitled ‘Your Kind of 
Country’ and sung by Colm C.T. Wilkinson the song contained some memorable 
lines, such as: 
 
We’re more than just statistics, and black official ink 
We got our pride and feelings 
They’re stronger than you think ... 
We need the kind of country where we can make our way  
That’s why I’m voting for a change 
On this Election Day. 
 
So let’s make it your kind of country 
Get out there and vote 
And show them that you’re free 
Show them that you care a damn 
And that you’ll win somehow 
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Help us to make it 
Your country now 
 
Dismissed by the Fine Gael – Labour Party government as an ‘election gimmick’ 
(Ryan, 1977) the record deliberately targeted the unprecedented number of first-time 
voters (the 1977 election would be the first in which voters from the age of 18 could 
cast ballots). Banned after a week by RTÉ and with a similar prohibition issued to 
CIÉ bus drivers, the song attained a subversive quality its producers could only dream 
of.  ‘Your Kind of Country’ T-shirts proliferated during the campaign and while we 
can never know how many votes were won or lost as a result, it kept the party in the 
public eye. The initiative was considered such a success that in 1979, Cathal Dunne, 
nephew of Jack Lynch and singer/composer of Ireland’s entry to the Eurovision Song 
Contest that year, recorded the single ‘We’re On Our Way to Europe’ to coincide with 
the first direct elections to the European Parliament. Fianna Fáil produced another 
song for the June 1981 election but instead of being a song that spoke generally of 
youth dissatisfaction with the status quo it was an entreaty to the electorate to ‘Arise 
and Follow Charlie’, a reference to party leader, Charles Haughey: 
 
Hail the leader, hail the man 
With Freedom’s cause, it all began 
With Irish Pride in every man 
We’ll Rise and Follow Charlie 
 
Though widely played throughout the campaign and appreciated by supporters ‘Arise 
and Follow Charlie’ marked the end of the brief experimentation with party election 
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campaign songs. An attempt to revive the idea in the mid-1990s with the penning of 
‘The Man They Call Ahern’ failed to take off. While commissioned by the party and 
premiered at a major rally at the National Stadium on 7 March 1995, the song was 
never recorded but was, instead, sung occasionally by party activists at social 
gatherings (Lord, 2007 & Dáil Debates, 1995). 
 
The personalisation of politics that television encouraged was very much in keeping 
with the 1980s, much of which was characterised by a political Punch and Judy show 
between Fine Gael leader Garret FitzGerald and his Fianna Fáil counterpart Charles 
Haughey. Capitalising on opinion polls that found that FitzGerald was more popular 
than Haughey, Fine Gael election posters asked the electorate, in November 1982, to 
‘Put the Right Man Back’ and emphasised that FitzGerald had ‘a strong team united 
behind his leadership’ hinting at the contrasting disunity in Fianna Fáil. With a failing 
economy and a divisive leader, the Fianna Fáil leadership responded by playing the 
green card and questioning FitzGerald’s patriotism. A Fianna Fáil election leaflet in 
one constituency adapted the famous British army World War One recruiting poster 
with the slogan ‘Thatcher wants Garret. Do you? Safeguard Irish neutrality. Vote 
Fianna Fáil’. 
 
This electoral cult of personality extended to the smaller parties. When the 
Progressive Democrats (PDs) contested their first general election in 1987 they 
adopted (apparently against the wishes of their leader, Des O’Malley) a presidential 
style campaign though they made it clear (and their candidate numbers indicated) that 
they were seeking the balance of power. The campaign slogan – ‘Dessie Can Do It’ – 
involved the reinvention of Des O’Malley from errant Fianna Fáil TD of almost two 
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decades standing to a new visionary with fresh ideas. In keeping with this dynamic 
image, O’Malley embarked on a helicopter tour of the country. The PDs made a virtue 
of the fact that many of their candidates were political novices by stressing that they 
were not tainted with the failure of governments past. They were also instrumental in 
depriving Fianna Fáil of overall majorities in 1987 and 1989, which, in turn, prompted 
Charles Haughey to abruptly and unilaterally jettison his party’s anti-coalition 
‘principle’. Since then all parties have contested elections with the working 
assumption that some kind of coalition arrangement would need to be negotiated after 
the election and have tailored their election messages accordingly. 
 
The three elections that took place during the economic boom (1997, 2002, 2007) 
were dominated by the irrepressible success of Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern and 
his inner circle. The first leader since de Valera to win three successive general 
elections, Ahern withstood the challenges of three different Fine Gael leaders – John 
Bruton, Michael Noonan and Enda Kenny. By the time of the 1997 election Ahern 
had discarded his trademark anorak for well-tailored suits and his party’s election 
poster depicted a shot of a pensive leader over the banner ‘people before politics’. 
Ahern represented a new type of leader in Irish politics – the ‘everyman’ whose 
popularity stemmed not from his exceptional qualities but from his very ordinariness, 
informality and accessibility. Few commended his intellect, or his oratory, and yet he 
commanded widespread approval and affection, bordering on devotion. Government 
setbacks or crises never dented Ahern’s enduring popularity. So great was his ability 
to retain his personal approval-ratings irrespective of how grave or high-profile the 
scandal might be that he was dubbed the ‘Teflon Taoiseach’. Buoyed by a booming 
economy Ahern could not be touched by political or journalistic adversaries. In 2007, 
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after a decade in power, Ahern was still deemed Fianna Fáil’s strongest card with all 
party candidates depicted on their election posters as being part of ‘Bertie’s Team’. 
Ahern was photo-shopped into pictures that contained different target sections of the 
electorate and the campaign slogan – ‘the next steps’.  
 
The volume of elections influences the amount that parties can raise to communicate 
their message. The holding of a snap election in September 1927, just three months 
after the previous one, meant that only the larger parties could mount two campaigns 
while smaller parties like Sinn Féin, Clann Éireann and the like fell by the wayside. 
Similarly three elections in 18 months during 1981–82 resulted in a progressive 
reduction of expenditure. The estimated spending of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael 
declined from £1.6 million (June 1981) to £1 million (February 1982) to £500,000 
(November 1982) (O’Leary, 1982, 366; 1983, 175). It was not beyond the ingenuity 
of political leaders to try to extract political capital from these cutbacks; driving home 
the point that political parties, like the nation, had little to spend, Garret FitzGerald 
did much of his campaign travel by scheduled trains (RTÉ, 1982a). The cost of 
electioneering proliferated during the years of the Celtic Tiger, with lamp-post posters 
costing €6 euro apiece and billboards €1,000 a fortnight for the 2007 contest. Despite 
these costs, 450 tonnes of posters were produced for the campaign (RTÉ, 2007b). 
 
Smears, scares and slurs 
Negative campaigning has a long history in Ireland. The civil war provided the 
material for much of the election literature of the Irish Free State’s first decade. 
Confronted with a resurgent Fianna Fáil, Cumann na nGaedheal (the predecessors of 
contemporary Fine Gael) presented themselves during the 1932 campaign as Ireland’s 
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‘bulwark against the terrorists’ in a country that lay ‘in the shadow of the gunman.’ 
The government portrayed Fianna Fáil as the instigators of a communist revolution 
under the guise of patriotism. As one advertisement, which took up the entire front 
page of the Irish independent, famously put it: ‘The gunmen are voting for Fianna 
Fáil. The Communists are voting for Fianna Fáil. How will you vote?’ (Ó Beacháin, 
2010, 126). Similarly, on election day the Irish Independent’s editorial warned voters 
that ‘the very life of the State’ was at stake, and that should they choose Fianna Fáil 
the verdict of the world would be ‘suicide during temporary insanity’ (Irish 
Independent, 1932).  
 
Once ensconced in office, Fianna Fáil employed the same election scares in an effort 
to maintain power. During the 1940s, its message to the electorate could be reduced to 
an assertion that as the only organisation able to offer a single-party government 
(considered synonymous with stability), Fianna Fáil was the only defence against 
anarchy. ‘If you vote Fianna Fáil, the bombs won’t fall’, the party proclaimed during 
the 1943 election. Fianna Fáil tried to whip up anti-communist hysteria by describing 
the mild-mannered William Norton as ‘the Kerensky of the Labour Party’, who, 
despite his innocuous rhetoric, was in reality ‘preparing the way for the red shirts’ 
(MacEntee, 1943). The scare worked; the Labour Party obligingly split in two early in 
1944 on the issue of the level of communism within the party and during the election 
later that year the rival factions were too busy attacking each other to land many 
blows on de Valera’s government.  
 
Clann na Poblachta replaced Labour as the target of electoral red scares during the 
1948 election. Taking out expensive half-page advertisements in national and local 
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newspapers headed ‘A Plan for Safety’ Fianna Fáil warned of forces working for the 
overthrow of democracy, ‘disguised . . . perhaps even under names in the Irish 
language.’ Their methods would be ‘to destroy confidence in the motives of the 
Government, and, if possible, by slander and abuse of political leaders, to weaken 
public faith in the democratic system.’ The advertisement concluded in apocalyptic 
terms by claiming that the free election that would bring ‘the enemies of Christianity 
and democracy’ to power ‘is always the last free election ever held.’ Predicting that 
revolutionary danger was ‘on the horizon’, the advertisement maintained that a vote 
for Fianna Fáil’s opponents would signal the end of Christianity and democracy in 
Ireland and the triumph of revolutionary communism: 
 
The ‘cells’, whose task it is to exploit temporary causes of public discontent, 
and to promote social unrest are at work. The chance of destroying the Fianna 
Fáil Government, which the General Election gives them is being fully used . . 
. Fianna Fáil means safety. It means the preservation of democracy . . . which 
is the alternative to dictatorship. This is why these elections in Ireland are so 
important. That is why Fianna Fáil must win. (Connacht Tribune, 1948) 
 
A comparison of the 1932 and 1948 elections demonstrates how close Fianna Fáil had 
come to the Cumann na nGaedheal party it had reviled. So great was the campaign in 
1932 to portray Fianna Fáil as Bolsheviks that the party manifesto stated that they had 
‘no leanings towards communism and no belief in communistic doctrines’ (Fianna 
Fáil, 1932). By 1948, Seán MacBride, like de Valera before him, was forced to claim 
that his policies coincided with Papal encyclicals and that there were ‘no 
Communists’ in his party (Irish Times, 1948). Cumann na nGaedheal’s 1932 election 
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slogan of ‘Safety first’ differed little from that adopted by Fianna Fáil after sixteen 
years in power: ‘Play safe’. The 1969 election brought the return of the ‘red scare’ to 
Irish politics. Having temporarily overcome its phobia about the word ‘socialism’ the 
Labour Party boldly entered the election asking the people to ‘peel off the tattered 
rags and battered image of the old Republic of the conservative Civil War politicians.’ 
Instead electors were exhorted to vote for ‘the new Republic,’ a land of communal 
responsibility, full employment and equal opportunity (Irish Times, 1969a). Few 
could imagine a more unlikely standard-bearer of socialism than Brendan Corish, who 
throughout the 1960s had displayed a greater knowledge of Papal encyclicals than 
many a parish priest. However, Fianna Fáil portrayed Corish as a man in the thrall of 
Marxist intellectuals eager to seize power and eradicate civil liberties. In keeping with 
traditional policy, Fianna Fáil did not issue a manifesto. In practice this was to allow 
the party the maximum flexibility after taking office, but Charles Haughey, as director 
of elections, offered a new ideological pretext. ‘Manifestos,’ he claimed, ‘have a 
Marxist ring about them’ (Irish Times, 1969b). With characteristic gusto, the veteran 
red-baiter Seán MacEntee claimed that the Labour Party stood for Lenin, Stalin and 
the ‘red flames of burning homesteads in Meath’ (Irish Times, 1969c).  
 
In full-page advertisements in the national newspapers, the traditional argument 
espousing the virtues of a united single-party government (i.e. Fianna Fáil) as against 
a divided coalition of irreconcilables was extensively employed. Particular emphasis 
was given to those in the Labour Party who constituted a ‘group of extreme left-wing 
socialists . . . preaching class warfare and who want total state control and all that 
goes with it’ (Irish Times, 1969d). Neil Blaney warmed to this subject, accusing the 
Labour Party of promoting the ‘failed system of atheistic socialism’ of the Soviet 
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Union, Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam, where ‘the freedom of man is a myth, where 
democracy has been trampled down and brutal dictatorship is supreme’ (Irish Times, 
1969e). The Labour Party programme, he concluded, was not for 1969 but for 1984 
(Irish Times, 1969f). Jack Lynch claimed that by voting for Fianna Fáil the people 
would demonstrate ‘that they prefer the reality of progress and prosperity to the 
Cuban myth’ (Irish Times, 1969g). Anti-intellectualism was also much in evidence. 
Mícheál Ó Móráin, the minister for justice, condemned the ‘left-wing political queers 
from Trinity College and Telefís Éireann’, while another candidate, Joe Dowling, 
declared that ‘the intellectuals had never done a day’s real work in their lives’ (Irish 
Times, 1969h; 1969i). Failing to make a major breakthrough, the Labour Party 
reverted to its default position of cautious moderation. The red scares snuffed out 
what little prospects there were for left wing or radical ideas to flourish during the 
early decades of the state.  
 
Opinion polls 
Political parties and commentators only began to understand that opinion polls 
provided an accurate reflection of voter sentiment after these same polls correctly 
predicted a Fianna Fáil landslide in 1977, despite the ill-concealed confidence of the 
government and media that the ruling coalition would be returned. Though the first 
opinion poll in Ireland seems to have been conducted as early as 1961 this was 
considered a novelty. The Labour Party had conducted a major internal poll in 1969 
and there were sporadic efforts at party polling during the early 1970s but, as Garret 
FitzGerald recalls, most politicians viewed these as ‘unreliable’. His party leader and 
Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave was ‘known to be particularly dismissive of polls 
preferring rather oddly to be guided on public opinion by individual letters . . . 
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extracts of which he sometimes read to us in Government’ (FitzGerald, 1991, 320). 
Cosgrave’s hostility to polls had had a public airing at the 1972 Fine Gael ard fheis, 
when he attacked a market research company that had conducted a recent poll saying 
that ‘those who organised it could now give back the thirty pieces of silver’, which 
seemed to suggest that the pollsters produced the results desired by their paymasters 
(FitzGerald, 1991, 105–6). When Cosgrave indicated that he wanted an election in 
June 1977 there were some ministers who favoured a later date – when economic 
reforms would have taken greater effect – and considered conducting a poll but, as 
FitzGerald recalls ‘we were inhibited from suggesting it by the dismissive reaction we 
believed we would have met from most of our colleagues, including the Taoiseach’ 
(FitzGerald, 1991, 320).  
 
Indifference to polls extended to the media. On their eve-of-poll front page the Irish 
Times proclaimed that according to their team of reporters who had covered all 42 
constituencies ‘the Coalition will win the election by a fairly comfortable margin’ 
while the following day the banner headline was ‘Coalition set to take election’ (Irish 
Times, 1977a; 1977b). So great was the media consensus on the outcome that Seán 
Duignan said that if Fianna Fáil won the election it would be ‘the greatest comeback 
since Lazarus’ and that the elite corps of political correspondents would have ‘a lot of 
egg on their faces’ (Farrell, 1977, 97). Following Fianna Fáil’s victory – the biggest in 
Irish electoral history – Garret FitzGerald, in an opinion piece published in the Irish 
Times (1977c), urged a reconsideration of attitudes to opinion polls: 
 
The failure of most commentators and politicians to detect the change in mood 
and to evaluate its political consequences has been aggravated by what might 
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perhaps be described somewhat paradoxically as a naive cynicism of most 
people in Ireland with regard to public opinion polls . . . Perhaps the result of 
this election will encourage all concerned to take these polls more seriously in 
the future. 
 
After 1977 opinion polls would become an integral part of the electoral landscape to 
the extent that they have become stories in themselves and frequently frame election 
debates. Indeed, there is some currency to the criticism that, as Christopher Hitchens 
(2010) put it, ‘to be able to cite a poll is now the shortest cut to economizing both on 
thought and on research.’ While poll results are always welcomed by those whom are 
reported to be performing well, politicians have developed an arsenal of well-
rehearsed responses to poor showings. These include the rejoinder that the poll is just 
a ‘snapshot in time’, that it ‘doesn’t reflect what is being said on the doorstep’ and/or 
that ‘the only poll that counts is that held on Election Day’.  
 
Polls not only reflect but also have come to greatly influence what people think and 
how they will vote. Candidates and parties can, consequently, become a victim of 
good poll results as Seán Gallagher discovered during the 2011 presidential election 
(see below). During the 2002 general election campaign, Fianna Fáil’s march towards 
an overall majority was thwarted in large part by the burden of glowing opinion polls, 
which put party support at 59%, prompting its coalition partners, the Progressive 
Democrats to launch a campaign under the banner of ‘One Party Government – No 
Thanks’. Though Fianna Fáil spokespersons did their best to dampen speculation that 
they could form a single party administration, and Bertie Ahern even went so far as to 
state a personal preference to maintain the coalition should his party secure an overall 
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majority – the PD campaign, assisted by influential media commentators, provoked a 
significant portion of the electorate to reflect on whether Fianna Fáil could indeed be 
trusted to govern alone. Consequently, the PDs, as self-appointed guardians of Fianna 
Fáil’s morality, doubled their parliamentary representation to eight seats, despite a dip 
in their vote, and Fianna Fáil fell just short of a majority (Collins, 2005, 211–13).  
 
Presidential elections  
Presidential elections are fundamentally different from general elections in that 
candidates are not competing for power. The lack of influence is all the more 
anomalous considering that the president is considered to personify and represent the 
nation and is the only political position that is elected nationally. This need to appeal 
to the national electorate for an office with very few competencies has produced 
increasingly surreal struggles in which candidates engage in a popularity contest to 
prove that they are needed to fill a position that, however desirable, many appreciate 
is politically superfluous.  
 
Hard as it is to believe today, opposition in 1937 to the constitutional provisions 
establishing the presidency centred on the charge that it would become the platform 
for dictatorship, a fear dampened by the selection by parliamentary consensus of 78-
year-old Dubhghlas de hÍde (Douglas Hyde) as first president. A Protestant cultural 
nationalist, with no identifiable party preference and certainly no political ambition, 
de hÍde defused the controversy and subsequent presidential elections were, with 
some minor exceptions, characterised by mild-mannered competition between senior 
citizens. Since 1938 the presidency has been determined without a contest on six 
occasions, when the major political parties have conspired to block a number of 
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candidates. For example, after the premature death of one president, and the 
resignation of another in rapid succession, the Irish political elite, eager for a safe pair 
of hands, agreed, in 1976, on the candidature of Patrick Hillery who served a full two 
terms and 14 years as president without ever submitting himself to the electorate.  
 
Presidential elections since 1990 represent a second era. These were the first contests 
that incorporated opinion polls, TV debates and other features of modern 
electioneering. The Fine Gael 1990 presidential campaign was debilitated from the 
start by the knowledge that candidate Austin Currie was asked to run after several 
party notables, including Garret FitzGerald and Alan Dukes, had demurred. 
Nominated by the Labour and Workers’ parties Mary Robinson embarked on an 
impressive six month door-to-door campaign but opinion polls suggested that she was 
still likely to lose to the frontrunner, Fianna Fáil veteran Brian Lenihan, until a media 
ambush transformed the campaign. When an interview given by Lenihan to student 
and Fine Gael member, Jim Duffy, several months before the campaign contradicted a 
question asked by another Fine Gael activist on the current affairs programme 
‘Questions and Answers’, his campaign was dealt a severe blow. He hoped to revive 
his fortunes by agreeing to a televised interview with RTÉ’s political correspondent, 
Seán Duignan, but it backfired. Lenihan’s key defence, that ‘on mature recollection’ 
he had erred in the interview he had given to Jim Duffy attracted ridicule and his 
tactic of staring into the camera failed to assuage voter incredulity. His support 
recovered as he garnered sympathy after being fired from his ministerial post, not 
least because he was a visibly ill man still recuperating from a liver transplant 
operation. It was not enough, however, and despite Lenihan outpolling his rivals on 
the first count, Currie’s transfers ensured Robinson’s triumph.  
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Robinson’s election campaign proved that a door-to-door campaign, combined with 
generous media coverage, could challenge the more established political dynasties. So 
successful was Robinson’s presidency considered to be that all parties and ambitious 
independents sought to emulate the ‘model’. Whereas in 1990 Mary Robinson had 
been the first female candidate ever for the presidency, the 1997 contest saw four 
women seeking the office (a solitary male candidate ran as an independent and came 
last). Despite a dirty campaign during which her critics charged her with being ‘soft 
on Sinn Féin’ (encapsulated by Eoghan Harris, the Sunday Independent columnist and 
manager of Derek Nally’s presidential campaign, who referred to her as a ‘tribal time 
bomb’), Mary McAleese won easily, becoming in the process the first president from 
Northern Ireland.  
 
The presidency lapsed back into the bad old ways when, in 2004, all the major parties 
conspired to avoid a contest. However, the 2011 election witnessed a return to 
competition with an unprecedented seven candidates who debated on the national 
airwaves on eight occasions (also a record) over a 25 day period. Cognisant that the 
constitution denied presidents from exercising real power, prospective candidates 
could not advocate policies as such, which reduced the contest to one between 
personalities. Most candidates had an Achilles Heel that the media targeted. It is Seán 
Gallagher’s candidacy, however, that best illustrates how glowing opinion polls and a 
media ambush can conspire to deny victory. Throughout the campaign, Gallagher 
exuded confidence, ability, focus, and determination. Consequently in the month 
before election day his poll ratings almost quadrupled from 11% to 40% and as 
polling day beckoned, Gallagher’s lead over his only realistic rival, Michael D. 
Higgins, appeared insurmountable. His stellar performance in the polls prompted 
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journalists and media commentators to cast a more critical eye on Gallagher’s 
candidacy. Though the media is legally bound to afford each candidate fair and 
balanced coverage Gallagher was the target of more hostile questions than any of his 
rivals during the final TV debate and an unverified tweet from a bogus twitter account 
was read out, which depicted him as a Fianna Fáil bagman. With a blanket ban on 
electioneering and campaign reporting on the verge of kicking in, Gallagher had only 
a day to manage the crisis. His Icarus-like performance demonstrates the dangers of 
peaking too early in opinion polls. Gallagher’s complaints regarding the 
disproportionate amount of hostile questions he was subjected to in the end-of-
campaign debate and the failure to authenticate the controversial tweet were 
ultimately upheld by the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (BAI, 2012) but this 
vindication did not compensate for the loss of the presidency.  
 
From television to twitter  
As early as 1958, Key (1958, 375–6) observed in the United States that ‘the doorbell 
ringers have lost their function of mobilising the vote to the public relations experts’. 
The ascendancy of media advisers came later to Ireland. As long-time Fianna Fáil 
minister, Kevin Boland (1989, 6), reflected: 
 
Consultation with the grassroots was, of course, an antediluvian practice 
outdated by the advent of the Think Tank. The organisation had been brought 
up to date, rationalised. There was a new tier of professionally qualified 
advisers available now, financed by the contributions of big business, which 
believed in requiting services rendered. The role of voluntary workers ‘on the 
ground’ was simplified. They were for putting up posters, carrying out the 
62 
 
National Collection which was a public relations exercise rather than a 
significant source of revenue, and for comprising awe-struck audiences to hear 
the words of wisdom relayed to them from the Think Tank via the local 
deputy. 
 
With the advent of television came criticisms that politics had been trivialised as the 
tyranny of the soundbite ruled supreme. Political life became more about 
choreography. Ard-fheiseanna [party conferences], now televised, are more for public 
consumption than the party faithful, who view them as social occasions. In these 
circumstances, strict discipline is expected and motions are carefully monitored lest 
they alienate the viewing public. Inevitably, the intellectual calibre of debates has 
greatly declined. Moreover, party tasks – particularly at elections – are increasingly 
remunerative.  
 
Ireland had to wait until the early 1980s for election debates on national television. 
Ever since the famous Nixon–Kennedy debate in 1960, analysts have attempted to 
assess the influence of election debates in influencing voters in consolidated 
democracies. Fresh from his fact-finding mission to the US, Fianna Fail’s party 
secretary, the young Séamus Brennan, returned to Ireland armed with an array of new 
ideas including TV ads, campaign battlebuses and billboards, and persuaded Jack 
Lynch to publicly challenge Liam Cosgrave to a TV election debate (Lahiffe, 2009, 
7–8). Cosgrave’s dismissal of the offer as a gimmick only assisted his rival and was 
true to form. Lynch and Cosgrave represented two very different styles of political 
communication and as Olivia O’Leary (2006, 11) has pointed out: 
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Lynch . . . suited an age which was moving away from megaphones and 
chapel-gate meetings. Ireland’s public debate now happened on the national 
television service which had expanded and moved from black and white to 
colour, and people had got used to the shorter, feel-good messages of 
commercial advertising. Lynch’s avuncular, pipe-smoking presence suited the 
more intimate atmosphere of a television studio. People watching from their 
armchairs at home felt reassured . . . Cosgrave’s bristly moustache and his stiff 
military bearing looked out of place on television. He was uneasy with the 
informal style of television interviewing and refused to allow any intrusion 
into his private life. He avoided the limelight as much as he could and let the 
many stars in his cabinet shine instead. He belonged to another age. 
 
Their successors as leaders of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, Charles Haughey and Garret 
FitzGerald, did not immediately agree to a TV debate and during their first contest in 
June 1981 there was no direct one-to-one confrontation but rather a panel of 
journalists interrogated the three main party leaders. Ireland had to wait until February 
1982 for its first television showdown. Two days before election-day the Fianna Fáil 
and Fine Gael leaders participated for the first time in a live television debate 
moderated by ‘Today Tonight’ host, Brian Farrell (RTÉ, 1982). A TV debate between 
FitzGerald and Haughey was also the highlight of the November 1982 election 
campaign. Haughey, the more aggressive on the night, emphasised that, unlike Fine 
Gael, his government had produced an economic plan and he stressed the 
impossibility of any party but his securing an overall majority and the dangers of 
unstable government. FitzGerald contrasted the unity of his own party to the well-
known internal dissensions within Fianna Fáil. Though no clear victor emerged from 
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the debate FitzGerald was able to form a Fine Gael – Labour Party coalition 
government after election-day. 
 
During the 1997 election, the format of TV debates had to adapt to the slow 
proliferation of parties. The governing ‘rainbow coalition’ of Fine Gael, Labour and 
Democratic Left was being challenged by a rival Fianna Fáil – Progressive Democrats 
combination though there was considerable disparities in party strength and their 
places in opinion polls. Consequently, the new Fianna Fáil leader, Bertie Ahern, 
debated with John Bruton in what might be dubbed as the Taoiseach debate while the 
PD leader Mary Harney took on Dick Spring in a contest between prospective 
Tánaistí. The Democratic Left leader, Proinsias de Rossa, was left with no one to 
debate and so was instead interviewed by RTÉ presenter Eamonn Lawlor.  
 
Despite becoming an integral part of election campaigns, securing large audiences and 
attracting extensive media analyses, TV debates have never become the game-
changers that many believed they might or can be. The media consensus that Michael 
Noonan had demolished Bertie Ahern in the 2002 debate (the analysis on RTÉ 
alternately described Ahern as ‘stuttering’, ’stumbling’, ‘nervous’, ‘in flight’, 
‘uncomfortable’, ’on the backfoot’, ‘on the ropes’, and ‘wide-eyed with terror’) did 
not reflect the election result; Fine Gael reached an historic low while Ahern led 
Fianna Fáil to within a whisker of an overall majority (RTÉ, 2002). The 2007 debate 
between Bertie Ahern and Enda Kenny favoured the incumbent while a debate for the 
leaders of the smaller parties produced some memorable one liners as when Labour’s 
Pat Rabbitte depicted the PD’s Michael McDowell as a ‘menopausal Paris Hilton . . . 
an inveterate attention-seeker’ and McDowell’s responded that the opposition was 
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composed of ‘the left (Labour), the hard left (Sinn Féin) and the leftovers (Greens)’ 
(Irish Examiner, 2007). The 2011 election produced two firsts. Apart from the debate 
between the leaders of the two main parties, Micheál Martin and Enda Kenny, there 
was also a five way debate including the leaders of the Labour Party, Sinn Féin and 
the Green Party. And on TG4 Martin, Kenny and Gilmore conducted the first TV 
election debate exclusively through the medium of the Irish language. 
 
In recent years, Facebook and Twitter have become core communication platforms for 
politicians and their parties. According to one survey of 48 TDs conducted shortly 
before the February 2011 general election less than one third (32%) had used social 
networking tools during the 2007 election but over three quarters (77%) would do so 
during the 2011 contest. Facebook was the most popular social media tool for the TDs 
(86%) with Twitter lagging some distance behind (42%). While a substantial majority 
(60%) of those politicians surveyed maintained that door-to-door canvassing and face-
to-face communication were the most important means of communication during an 
election campaign, almost nine out of ten (88%) believed that social media is 
changing the dynamics of politics and communication with voters, and almost all 
believed they would be using these media (blogs, YouTube) more frequently and 
expansively in the future (O’Keefe and Cunningham, 2010). There was certainly no 
correlation between the numbers of followers of the Twitter accounts of politicians or 
the volume of Tweets sent, with the number of votes garnered on polling day 2011.  
For one thing, followers are not geographically concentrated; ultimately, it is not the 
number of supporters globally but, rather, in one’s constituency that carries a 
candidate into office.  Moreover, to follow a candidate on Twitter does not necessarily 
imply an endorsement of their political views. Prior to the 2011 general election, the 
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Green Party was unique in that all six of its TDs had Twitter accounts compared to 
75% of Labour TDs, 37% of Fine Gael TDs and a mere 27% of Fianna Fáil TDs 
(siliconrepublic.com, 2010). The minister for communications, energy and natural 
resources, Eamon Ryan of the Green Party, had the most followers of any Oireachtas 
member and those following Green Party leader John Gormley outnumbered those of 
the then Taoiseach-apparent, Enda Kenny, who tweeted daily as election day 
approached. History records, however, that the Green Party was annihilated in 
election 2011, losing its entire parliamentary representation in the process, while Enda 
Kenny led Fine Gael to an historic victory, attaining more seats for his party than at 
any time in its 80 year history. 
 
The 2011 election was the first to involve Twitter and it is quite clear that the use of 
this social medium was very much in transition. On the eve of the 2011 election, only 
38% of TDs (63 out of 166) had Twitter accounts. Within a year of the February 2011 
election, however, this number had risen to 139 (84%) and at the time of writing (June 
2013) the figure is 147 (88.55%). Fine Gael now has the highest percentage of TDs on 
Twitter (93%) followed by the Labour Party (82%) and Sinn Féin (64%) with Fianna 
Fáil still lagging (58%), in particular when compared to independent TDs and those of 
the smaller parties, 89% of whom have Twitter accounts. Sometimes it is the man and 
not the message that has attracted followers. In February 2012, Taoiseach Enda 
Kenny had the highest number of followers despite not having tweeted since July 
2011, while the minister for education, Ruairí Quinn, ranked 15
th
 in terms of 
followers despite never having tweeted (Murray Consultants, 2012b). 
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While it is too early in the evolution of these types of social media to determine the 
influence they will exert during elections, a few trends are already evident. While 
there are four times as many Facebook accounts in Ireland as those for Twitter 
(approximately 2 million compared to 500,000) the number of Facebook and Twitter 
accounts attached to TDs is relatively even (297,000 v. 234,000), suggesting that 
Twitter is more politicised (candidate.ie, 2012b) and, therefore, likely to be of greater 
importance in forthcoming elections. This is underlined by the fact that, as of the end 
of 2012, the number of individuals following the flagship accounts of the political 
parties was over 25% greater on Twitter than on Facebook (candidate.ie, 2012c). 
Facebook is more suited to detailed press releases, dissemination of photos and 
videos, whereas Twitter has a more immediate news value, its terseness more in tune 
with the age of the soundbite. Smaller and challenging parties along with 
independents have, initially at least, shown most enthusiasm and success in embracing 
new media (Candidate.ie, 2012a, 2012c) but this edge is already being eroded as the 
bigger and more established parties direct their assistants to manage Facebook and 
Twitter accounts as part and parcel of the routine political activity of disseminating 
policies, publicising achievements and criticising opponents. However, new social 
media will most likely complement rather than replace traditional election tactics, 
which in the Irish context rely very much on face-to-face encounters.  
 
Conclusion 
The passing of the revolutionary elite combined with technological advances has 
ensured that the way in which politicians communicate with the electorate has 
evolved over the decades. Despite the ascendancy of the media as a means of 
communicating political messages during election campaigns, and irrespective of the 
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fact that journalists and broadcasters generally prefer gladiatorial, adversarial 
contests, election campaigns today are much less confrontational than they were 
during the early decades of the state. The rival eve-of-election monster meetings have 
given way to TV debates though these have never been decisive. Opinion polls, once 
considered akin to political astrology, now play a major role in framing debates and, 
along with focus groups, help parties fine-tune and tweak their policies. The door-to-
door, house-to-house style of campaigning has not died however. All indications are 
that voters still need to feel they ‘know’ a politician before voting for them and this 
can only be satisfied by the candidate making all efforts to come to the voter be they 
in shopping malls, on the street, or at home. Social media will undoubtedly make 
greater inroads in coming elections. It will, however, most likely complement rather 
than replace the existing emphasis on personal interaction. As a people living in a 
small country, with multi-member constituencies and an electoral system that 
encourages clientalism while placing a high premium on ‘preferences’, Irish voters 
are not quite ready for an exclusively virtual relationship with their political 
representatives.    
 
References  
BAI (2013) See < http://www.rte.ie/news/2012/0307/bai_gallagher_ruling.pdf >  
 
Boland, K. (n.d. / c.1989) ‘The unnecessary coalition’, published by the author.  
 
Candidate.ie (2012a) ‘Mid-term report for Leinster House – Facebook & Twitter 
analysis’ (3 November) See < http://candidate.ie/?p=1942 > 
 
69 
 
Candidate.ie (2012b) ‘The 31st Dáil on Facebook and Twitter’ (3 November). See  
< http://candidate.ie/?p=1934 > 
 
Candidate.ie (2012c) ‘Party Flagship Accounts’ (31 October). See  
< http://candidate.ie/?p=1905 > 
 
Cohan, A.S. (1972) The Irish political elite, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.   
 
Collins, S. (2005) Breaking the mould: how the PDs changed Irish politics, Dublin: 
Gill & Macmillan.  
 
Connacht Tribune, (1948) ‘A plan for safety’ (24 January). 
 
Dáil Debates, vol. 450, col. 451 (8 March, 1995). 
 
Dunne, S. Dáil Debates, vol. 192, col. 820–21 (23 November 1961).  
 
Farrell, B. (1971) ‘Dáil Deputies: the 1969 Generation’ in Economic and Social 
Review, 2(3): 309–27. 
 
Farrell, B. (1978) ‘The mass media and the 1977 campaign’ in Penniman, H.R. (ed.), 
Ireland at the polls: the Dáil election of 1977, Washington DC: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
Fianna Fáil, (1932) Manifesto dated 9 February, Fianna Fáil Archives, ff/789. 
70 
 
FitzGerald, G. (1991) All in a life, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. 
 
Hitchens, C. (2010) ‘All the views fit to print’, in Slate (1 November). 
 
Irish Examiner, (2007) ‘Sorry but Pat doesn’t do apologies’ (24 August). 
 
Irish Independent, (1932) ‘A fateful choice’ (16 February).  
 
Irish Times, (1977a) ‘Coalition to win comfortably’ (15 June). 
 
Irish Times, (1977b) ‘Coalition set to take election’ (16 June). 
 
Irish Times, (1977c) ‘Swing to FF is large only in context of recent past, says 
FitzGerald’ (21 June).  
 
Irish Times, (1948) ‘Intruders steal C. na P. scroll before meeting’ (15 January). 
 
Irish Times, (1969a) ‘Views of traditional politicians rejected’ (3 June).  
 
Irish Times, (1969b) ‘Haughey talks to press’ (4 June).  
 
Irish Times, (1969c) ‘MacEntee fears Marxist influence’ (14 June). 
 
Irish Times, (1969d) ‘The Choice’ (17 June). 
 
71 
 
Irish Times, (1969e) ‘Marxist infiltration warning by Blaney’ (17 June).  
 
Irish Times, (1969f) ‘In the field’ (10 June).  
 
Irish Times, (1969g) ‘Choice is reality or Cuban myth – Lynch’ (17 June).  
 
Irish Times, (1969h) ‘F.G. – Labour wedding warning by Ó Móráin’ (7 June). 
 
Irish Times, (1969i) ‘Councillors charged with play-acting’ (4 June). 
 
Key, V.O. (1958) Politics, parties, and pressure groups, New York: Crowell.  
 
Kircheimer, O. (1966) ‘The transformation of the western European party systems’, in 
J. LaPalombara, & Weiner, M. (eds), Political parties and political development, 
Princeton: University Press.  
 
Lahiffe, F. (2009) Séamus Brennan: a life in government, Dublin: Liffey Press. 
 
Lord, M. (2007) ‘Miriam Lord’s Week’ in Irish Times (7 April).  
 
MacEntee, S. (1943) speech made during the 1943 general election, UCD Archives,  
MacEntee Papers, P67/364. 
 
McLoone, M. & McMahon, J. (eds), (1984) Television and Irish society: 21 years of 
Irish television, Dublin: RTÉ / IFI. 
72 
 
Murray Consultants (2012a) ‘TDs’ Activity on Twitter Today’ (1 February)  
See < http://www.murrayconsult.ie/professional-insights/?p=156 > 
 
Murray Consultants (2012b) ‘Twitter Followers League Table 2012’  
See < http://www.murrayconsult.ie/professional-insights/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/2012-TD-Twitter-Followers-01.02.2012.pdf > 
 
Ó Beacháin, D. (2010) The destiny of the soldiers: Fianna Fáil, Irish republicanism 
and the IRA, 1926–1973, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.  
 
O’Keeffe, M. & Cunningham, S. (2010) ‘77 per cent of Politicians to embrace social 
media in next election’. See < http://irishmediawatch.com/77-per-cent-of-politicians-
to-embrace-social-media-in-next-election/ > 
 
O’Leary, C. (1982) ‘The Irish general elections of 1981 and 1982’ in Electoral 
Studies, 1(3): 363–74. 
 
O’Leary, C. (1983) ‘The Irish general election (November 1982)’ in Electoral 
Studies, 2(2): 171–75. 
 
O’Leary, O. (2006) Party Animals, Dublin: O’Brien Press.  
 
RTÉ (1982a) < http://www.RTÉ.ie/archives/exhibitions/688-elections/696-general-
election-1982-november/139431-garret-fitzgerald-takes-the-train/ 
 
73 
 
RTÉ (1982b) < http://www.RTÉ.ie/archives/exhibitions/688-elections/695-general-
election-1982-february/139438-first-televised-leaders-debate/ > 
 
RTÉ (2007a) < http://www.RTÉ.ie/archives/exhibitions/688-elections/702-general-
election-2007/139421-RTEs-largest-ever-coverage-of-election/?page=1 > 
 
RTÉ (2007b) < http://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/688-elections/702-general-
election-2007/139414-how-important-are-election-posters/ > 
 
RTÉ (2002) < http://www.RTÉ.ie/archives/exhibitions/688-elections/701-general-
election-2002/287735-laweb_general-elections-tonight-with-vincent-browne-leaders-
debate-noonan-ahern/?page=1 > 
 
Ryan, R. (1977) Minister for Finance, Richie Ryan speaking on ‘Election ’77 Special’ 
with John Bowman, available at < www.RTÉ.ie/archives/exhibitions/688-
elections/692-general-election-1977/287919-general-election-1977/ > 
 
Siliconrepublic.com (2010) ‘40pc of TDs among the Twitterati’ (14 October) See 
 < http://www.siliconrepublic.com/new-media/item/18313-40pc-of-tds-among-the-
twitterati >  
 
Whyte, J. (1966) Dáil Deputies, Dublin: Tuarim (15).    
 
 
